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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to the concept of user cost
and its determinants. Particular attention is given to the influence of taxation.
The concept of user cost relates to the rental, the rate of return to capital, that
arises in a profit maximising situation in which further investment in capital
produces no additional profit. This paper sets out in some detail the range of
assumptions involved in obtaining alternative expressions for the user cost. The
user cost refers to a before-tax capital rental, the rate of return that ensures that
the (after-tax) cost of capital is equal to the post-tax returns over its life. Hence,
associated with the user cost measure is an effective marginal tax rate. This can
differ substantially from the statutory marginal rate applicable to the investor.
A related effective average tax rate is also defined.
∗We should like to thank Martin Keene, Helen Miller and Florian Misch for their comments on an
earlier draft.
†New Zealand Treasury and Victoria University of Wellington.
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Executive Summary
The concept of user cost relates to the rate of return to capital, referred to as the rental,
that arises in a profit maximising situation. This is one in which further investment
in capital produces no additional profit. Despite this apparently simple statement, the
concept gives rise to a complex range of cases which need to be distinguished.
The importance of taxation and the link with optimising behaviour by firms means
that the user cost concept has a central role in investment and location decisions.
Differences in tax regimes among countries can influence the decision regarding where
to locate production and the head office of multinational firms. The relevant features
of tax regimes relate not only to the treatment of companies but to the individuals who
are the ultimate owners. Any change in a tax rate or tax structure which implies an
increase in the user cost of capital implies that firms need to obtain a higher pre-tax
rate of return or rental for an investment to be worthwhile.
The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to the concept of user cost
and its determinants, paying particular attention to the influence of taxation. This
paper sets out in some detail, using a consistent terminology, the range of assumptions
involved in obtaining alternative expressions for the user cost.
The user cost refers to a before-tax capital rental, the rate of return that ensures that
the (after-tax) cost of capital is equal to the post-tax returns. Hence, associated with
the user cost measure is an effective marginal tax rate. This can differ substantially
from the statutory marginal rate applicable to the investor. Particular attention is
given in this paper to the properties of the effective marginal tax rate in different
circumstances, drawing attention to the difference between tax-inclusive and exclusive
rates. It is shown that the relationship between the statutory tax rate and the effective
tax rate can vary substantially, depending on the rate of interest.
A related effective average tax rate is also defined for the context in which the firm
obtains economic rents (that is, earnings above those needed for it to remain in its
present position). This may be important in the context of multinational investment
where the firm is operating below its profit maximising output.
The link between the user cost, effective tax rates and investment is also briefly
discussed.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide an introduction to the concept of user cost and its
determinants, paying particular attention to the influence of taxation. In the standard
neoclassical model of production, the term ‘cost’ generally refers to an opportunity cost
rather than simply a direct pecuniary cost of a good or service. In the present context,
user cost relates to the rental, the rate of return to capital, that arises in a profit
maximising situation in which further investment in capital produces no additional
profit. This paper hopes to make this rather loose statement more precise and clear
by setting out in some detail the range of assumptions involved.1
To provide a little more context at this preliminary stage, consider a firm’s decision
to increase its investment in a capital asset. This decision depends on a complex range
of factors, including the cost of financing the investment and their tax treatment. Sup-
pose, for simplicity, that a single type of capital good is used in production. Assuming
that capital can be varied continuously, a basic implication of profit maximisation is
that the firm increases its investment until its total cost is equal to the present value
of the after-tax and depreciation returns from the flow of capital services, discounted
at a suitable rate over the life of the project. With an assumption of decreasing mar-
ginal returns, capital is increased until the condition is satisfied. It is not necessary to
suppose that the firm actually owns the capital good, the firm may be considered to
rent the corresponding capital services and for this reason the return is referred to as
a rental, for comparison with a wage rate.
Once this profit maximising position is achieved, a further increase in the use of
capital services produces zero profit. The marginal revenue product at that point
determines the capital rental. It is the before-tax rate of return, the capital rental
at the profit maximising level of investment, that defines the user cost. This concept
refers to the rate of return that ensures that the (after-tax) cost of capital is equal
to the after-tax return. Hence, associated with the user cost measure is an effective
marginal tax rate. As shown below, the effective marginal tax rate is typically not
equal to the statutory marginal rate applicable to the investor: they are equal only
under special conditions.
1This paper is not a literature review, so only selected references are made. The seminal paper is
Hall and Jorgensen (1967). See also Auerbach (1983, 2002), King and Fullerton (1984), Benge (1997,
1998) and Fabling et al. (2013).
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Additional important distinctions, other than between before- and after-tax values,
must also be made. The existence of inflation means that in practice a distinction must
be made between real and nominal values. The existence of depreciation means that a
distinction must be made between gross and net values. The simple statement above
must therefore be modified. The gross user cost is defined as the before-tax and before-
depreciation real capital rental, obtained from a marginal investment which must be
earned if the after-tax real rate of return (the rental adjusted for taxation, depreciation
and capital gains or losses) is equated to the cost of capital. The latter cost is given by
the after-tax real rate of interest. The net user cost is the gross user cost adjusted for
depreciation. As shown below, care is needed to disentangle the various components
in view of the complexity of tax structures.
The importance of taxation and the link with optimising behaviour by firms means
that the user cost concept has a central role in investment and location decisions.
Differences in tax regimes among countries can influence the decision regarding where
to locate production and the head office of multinational firms. The relevant features
of tax regimes relate not only to the treatment of companies but to the individuals
who are the ultimate owners.2 Any change in a tax rate or tax structure which implies
an increase in the user cost of capital implies that firms need to obtain a higher pre-
tax rate of return or rental for an investment to be worthwhile. An understanding of
precisely how taxation can affect the user cost in different circumstances is needed in
order to appreciate the incentives facing firms. Although the concept is central in the
neoclassical analysis of firms, and has important policy implications, its treatment is
typically given very little attention in economics texts, despite the extensive and often
technical literature in which it features. Therefore, the present introductory review
seems warranted.
Discussions of user cost are often not easy for the newcomer to follow. There
appears to be no settled terminology, let alone notation, and even the concept itself
is often described merely ‘in passing’ and is given various definitions when put into
words rather than equations, which may appear confusing to the uninitiated. The
assumptions behind its use are often not clear. Some authors even use the term ‘cost
2The situation is considerably complicated if the firm is not taxed as a separate entity, and is
owned by a number of individuals who may themselves face different marginal tax rates, as well as
different borrowing rates of interest. With such a diversity, there may not necessarily be unanimity
regarding the desired level of investment.
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of capital’ when referring to user cost, while others use the term ‘cost of capital’ (as
above) to refer to an appropriate rate of interest. Other authors refer to ‘gross user
cost’ when what they have in mind is a before-tax, but after depreciation, concept.
The present paper therefore attempts to provide a synthesis using a consistent
terminology. It adopts the standard in the national income accounting literature and
uses the terms ‘gross’ and ‘net’ to refer only to before- and after-depreciation quantities
respectively, and reserves the terms before- and after-tax (rather than pre- and post-
tax, or gross and net of tax) to refer respectively to quantities before and after any
tax is imposed. Some authors adopt without comment a widely-used approximation in
discrete-time contexts in which a real rate of return is expressed simply as a nominal
return minus an inflation rate, whereas other authors use the more precise Fisher
expression. The latter relationship is used here. Discussions are complicated by the
considerable complexity of corporate (and to a lesser extent personal) tax regimes,
involving the different treatment of forms of financing for corporations and individuals
(in their capacity as investors). This leads to a wide and often confusing range of cases,
following a taxonomy that is seldom fully articulated. The approach adopted here, as
befitting an introduction, is to concentrate on the relatively simpler cases rather than
providing an exhaustive catalogue.
Section 2 introduces the concept of user cost by considering the simplest case of
profit maximisation and investment in the absence of taxation. Section 3 extends the
derivation to include a simple treatment of taxation. Section 4 examines the after-tax
real interest rate. Section 5 considers the effective marginal tax rate. The question of
whether the user cost concept (necessarily associated with a marginal change) can be
extended to define an effective average tax rate is examined in Section 6. Section 7
turns briefly to the relationship between investment, the desired capital stock and the
user cost. Conclusions are in Section 8
2 User Cost: The Simplest Case
The concept of user cost, expressed somewhat imprecisely in section 1, can perhaps
most easily be understood by considering the simplest case where there is no taxation,
no inflation, and the capital good is not subject to depreciation. Furthermore, there
are no capital gains or losses to be made at the end of the project. In a discrete-time
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framework, consider an increase in capital in a period, where a single type of capital
is used in production and other inputs are held constant.3 This takes the form of an
investment in capital equipment in one period which is then reversed in the next period
(the equipment is sold, with neither a capital gain nor a loss).4 If the investment is
financed from existing assets (and is thus ‘equity financed’), there is an opportunity
cost of investment which depends on the return available from the next-best alternative
use. This opportunity cost is referred to as the ‘cost of funds’. If the investment is
financed by borrowing (and is thus ‘debt financed’), there is literally a cost of funds
reflected in the relevant interest rate paid.5
If the return arising from the investment exceeds the cost of funds, there is an
incentive to invest in more capital. On the assumption that there are decreasing
marginal returns to capital, the return falls as the level of investment increases so that
eventually the return is expected to equal the cost of funds. At the profit-maximising
situation, the value of an additional unit of investment (costing, say, one dollar) is
equal to its cost (equal to the rate of interest) so that additional profits are zero. In
the context of marginal productivity theory, the effective capital rental (the equivalent
of the wage rate applying to labour inputs) is equal to the marginal revenue product
of capital (marginal revenue multiplied by the marginal physical product). It is this
capital rental, associated with the profit maximising position, that is called the user
cost of capital.6 The user cost is thus equal to the rate of interest.7 The idea that user
cost relates to a profit-maximising equilibrium capital rental is crucial.
3The seminal treatment of user cost was by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), who used a continuous-
time framework. Their explanation of the basic result was extremely terse and for this reason further
details are given in Appendix A below.
4The assumption that there is no uncertainty and the project is reversible — the capital good can
be sold at the constant market price — means there is no question regarding the optimal timing of
investment. Hence an option value of waiting is not relevant here. A treatment of uncertainty in the
simple case considered in this section is contained in Appendix B.
5The implications of losses during some periods of a low output price, where there are tax asymme-
tries in the corporate and personal tax regimes, are also ignored. A pioneering approach to measuring
firm-specific marginal tax rates, by Graham (1996), used simplified assumptions about the use of losses
and simulation. See also Ramb (2007), Blouin et al. (2008). Dwenger and Walch (2011) accounted
for losses in looking at the user cost elasticity of investment.
6Alternatively, it may be said that the user cost is the minimum pre-tax rate of return (implicit
rental) that a project must generate in order to be profitable.
7The user cost has the same units as an interest rate. In some treatments the user cost appears to
be defined in terms of the rate of interest, but this equality is clearly a consequence rather than the
definition itself.
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Figure 1: The User Cost: No Taxation
The components are illustrated in Figure 1, which represents the situation for a
neoclassical firm with a standard production function involving inputs of capital ser-
vices. Labour and other inputs are assumed to be fixed. The horizonal axis measures
capital. The curve marked PV(Revenue—Cost) plots the variation in the present value
of revenue, net of costs, as the amount of capital used in production is increased. Hence
point C, where the curve reaches a turning point, corresponds to the profit-maximising
input of capital, B: this is considered to be the desired total capital. At the profit max-
imising position, a further marginal increase in capital input (a ‘marginal investment
project’ of, say, one dollar) necessarily produces no additional profit.
The user cost, c, is the marginal revenue product of capital at the profit maximising
position. If the price of the output is assumed to be constant (that is, it is sold
in a competitive market), price and marginal revenue are equal and it is possible to
normalise the output price to unity, so that c varies just as the marginal physical
product varies. In this special context of a small investment in period t which is
subsequently reversed, the cost of the project (which is the opportunity cost of the
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price of the extra capital) is effectively the interest, r, on the one dollar of investment
for one period. The ability to talk in terms simply of a ‘dollar of investment’ arises
from an assumption that the supply curve of capital is horizontal.
The equality of the user cost of capital, c, with the rate of interest — the opportunity
cost of capital — is reflected in Figure 1 by the point A, where the marginal revenue
product curve, marked MRPK, intersects the horizontal line reflecting the cost of
capital. It is shown below that this cost of capital needs to be modified, effectively
shifted upwards in the figure, by the existence of inflation and particularly taxation
which affects the real after-tax rate of interest. However, taxation does not affect the
MRPK curve, on the assumption that it does not affect prices. It is shown below how
this type of diagram allows marginal and average effective tax rates to be defined in
terms of the user cost.
Consider the addition of economic depreciation, at the real geometric rate of δ per
period.8 In terms of the marginal investment of $1, considered above, the profit is
equal to the gross rental income, cg, less depreciation over the period, or cg − δ. The
cost of funds is, as before, the real rate of interest available in the market, r. Hence
r = cg − δ and:
cg = r + δ (1)
This rental, cg, is the gross user cost of capital.
9 If the rental is considered to include
the cost of depreciation, then the corresponding concept is that of net user cost, cn.
Clearly, cn = cg − δ and cn = r.
The following sections introduce the complications arising from taxation. In view
of the many terms introduced, a list of the main variables is provided in Table 1.
3 Allowing for Taxation
The effect of taxation on the user cost is complicated by the fact that it depends both
on the investor and the method of finance. The investor may be a corporation or a
person, and each case may be subject to the domestic tax regime or may be a foreigner.
Under an imputation system, corporation tax is effectively a withholding tax, so that
8This involves the use of an effective discount rate of r + δ instead of r.
9Any real capital gain over the period can simply be subtracted from the right hand side of (1),
and is thus ignored here.
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Table 1: List of Variables Used
Variable Symbol
Inflation rate (CPI) pi
Corporate tax rate τ
Tax rate facing domestic investor m
Economic depreciation rate δ
Fiscal depreciation allowance δ′
Nominal interest rate i
After-tax nominal interest rate i∗ = i (1− τ)
Before-tax real interest rate r = (i− pi) / (1 + pi)
After-tax real interest rate r∗ = (i∗ − pi) / (1 + pi)
Proportional tax credit k
PV of depreciation allowance Z = δ′/ (i+ δ′)
World real interest rate rW
Real rate of return on equity rE
User cost (gross) cg
User cost (net of depreciation) cn = c− δ
Effective marginal (tax exclusive) tax rate τ ∗
the appropriate tax rate is the marginal rate, say m, faced by an individual investor.
If the investment is financed by debt, the interest is generally tax-deductible at the
corporate level only. However, equity finance is not eligible for a tax deduction. These
and other distinctions give rise to a complex and extensive taxonomy of cases, only a
limited number of which are examined here. This section considers the user cost in the
context of corporations rather than individuals.
3.1 Taxation of Corporations
The existence of tax credits and fiscal depreciation allowances implies that the cost of
a $1 unit of capital is effectively reduced by an amount, ξ, to $(1− ξ). Suppose the
statutory marginal corporate tax rate applied to taxable income is τ . The relevant
interest rate is now the after-tax real rate, denoted r∗. The equilibrium condition
defining the user cost states that the after-tax cost of capital associated with the
effective investment of $(1− ξ) is equal to the after-tax rate of return. The latter
is the after-tax rental, cg (1− τ ), arising from the real before-tax gross user cost, cg,
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minus the depreciation of δ (1− ξ). Hence:10
r∗ (1− ξ) = cg (1− τ )− δ (1− ξ) (2)
and the gross user cost becomes:11
cg =
(r∗ + δ) (1− ξ)
1− τ
(3)
As above, the net user cost, cn, is obtained simply by subtracting δ from cg. Separate
expressions for cn are therefore not given below unless they are specifically required.
3.2 Depreciation and Tax Credits
One component of the term, ξ, is a fiscal depreciation allowance at the (geometric) rate,
δ′.12 The question therefore arises of how to value such an allowance. The approach
here assumes that only one capital good is used. However, where several capital goods
are involved, the fiscal depreciation rate may differ, depending on the type of capital.
At the end of the first year, for the $1 investment, this allowance is simply δ′ which is
worth τδ′. At the end of the second year, the allowance of δ′ applies to (1− δ′) and is
worth τδ′ (1− δ′). At the end of the third year depreciation is δ′ (1− δ′)
2
, and so on.
The present value of the allowance, say Z, discounted at the nominal interest rate, i,
is given by:
Z =
δ′
1 + i
{
1 +
(
1− δ′
1 + i
)
+
(
1− δ′
1 + i
)2
+ ...etc
}
(4)
10If capital gains were non-zero, the appropriate value must be their after-tax value. The above
analysis also ignores local property taxes.
11This result corresponds to the original statement by Hall and Jorgenson (1967, p. 393), which
is given as c = q (r + δ) (1− k) (1− uz) / (1− u). Their u is the tax rate, while above q has been
normalised to 1. Their r is the real after-tax rate of interest, corresponding to r∗ above, and while z
is the same as defined in the following subsection, their term (1− k) (1− uz) corresponds to (1− ξ)
above (their investment tax credit is specified slightly differently from that in the following subsection).
Their z corresponds to Z below.
12Downs (1986) modifies the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) result to allow for non-geometric de-
preciation. He writes the basic Hall and Jorgenson formula as (ignoring the time argument):
c = q (r + δ − pi) (1− υ − τZ) / (1− τ) where, as above, τ is the tax rate and pi is the inflation rate.
But his r is the nominal interest rate as he is using the approximation r − pi for the real rate. His
ν is the effective rate of the investment tax credit. Downs shows that, if h (t) is the ‘percentage of
the asset’s original productive capacity lost at the [tth] moment after acquisition’, and (using present
notation for the real rate of interest) defining H =
∫∞
0
e−r
∗
th (t) dt, the user cost can be written as
(in present notation): c = r∗ (1− ξ) / {(1−H) (1− τ)}. This allows for any non-geometric form of
fiscal depreciation. For geometric depreciation, h (t) = δe−dt, H = δ/ (r∗ + δ), giving the Hall and
Jorgenson result.
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Using the standard result for the sum of an infinite geometric progression, 1+a+a2+
... = 1/ (1− a), then:
Z =
δ′
1 + i
{
1
1− 1−δ
′
1+i
}
=
δ′
i+ δ′
(5)
A second component of ξ may be a tax credit. This can take several forms, but suppose
it is equal to a proportion, k, of the investment (of $1).13 With a tax rate of τ , this is
worth τk, so that:
ξ = τ (k + Z) (6)
Substituting into (3), the gross user cost is:
cg = (r
∗ + δ) {1− τ (k + Z)}
1
1− τ
(7)
with cn = cg − δ.
3.3 User Cost in Terms of the After-Tax Nominal Interest
Rate
The real after-tax rate of interest, r∗, can be expressed in terms of the nominal after-
tax interest rate, i∗. As defined above, the inflation rate is pi, and Fisher’s equation
gives the relationship between nominal and real interest rates as:14
(1 + r∗) (1 + pi) = 1 + i∗ (8)
so that:
r∗ =
i∗ − pi
1 + pi
(9)
Substitution into (7) gives:
cg =
(
i∗ − pi
1 + pi
+ δ
)
{1− τ (k + Z)}
1
1− τ
(10)
13This is the tax allowance value of an investment tax credit. In New Zealand this is captured by
‘depreciation loadings’, expressed as a percentage, so that k would be replaced by a proportion of Z.
14As mentioned in the introduction, some authors use the approximation r∗ + pi = i∗.
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3.4 User Cost in Terms of Before-Tax Real Interest Rate
The user cost can also be related to the before-tax real interest rate. First, the rela-
tionship between nominal and real before-tax rates is:
(1 + r) (1 + pi) = 1 + i (11)
so that:
i = r (1 + pi) + pi (12)
Using i∗ = i (1− τ), and substituting into (9), the real after-tax rate of interest is given
in terms of i, pi and τ by:
r∗ =
i (1− τ)− pi
1 + pi
(13)
Finally, substitute (12) into (13) to get:
r∗ = r (1− τ)− τ
(
pi
1 + pi
)
(14)
Substituting this expression for r∗ into (7) gives:
cg =
{
r (1− τ )− τ
(
pi
1 + pi
)
+ δ
}
{1− τ (k + Z)}
1
1− τ
(15)
3.5 User Cost in Terms of Before-Tax Nominal Interest Rate
The user cost of capital in terms of the nominal before-tax interest rate, i, is obtained
by substituting for r∗ using (13), and for Z using (5), into (7):15
cg =
{
i (1− τ )− pi
1 + pi
+ δ
}{
1− τ
(
k +
δ′
i+ δ′
)}
1
1− τ
(16)
Writing ηa,b to indicate the elasticity of a with respect to changes in b, the following
results can be obtained.
ηcg,pi = −
pi
1 + pi
[
1 + i (1− τ )
δ (1 + pi)− pi + i (1− τ)
]
(17)
ηcg,τ = −τ
[
k + Z
1− τ (k + Z)
+
i
δ (1 + pi)− pi + i (1− τ )
−
1
1− τ
]
(18)
ηcg,i = i
[{
i+
δ (1 + pi)− pi
1− τ
}
−1
+
1
1 + δ′
{
(1 + δ′) (1− τ)
δ′
− τ
}−1]
(19)
15This is equivalent to the result in Benge (1997, p. 11), with the rate facing an individual investor,
m, replacing the corporate tax rate, τ .
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4 The After-Tax Real Interest Rate
In the previous section it was mentioned that distinctions can be drawn between debt
and equity financing and the location and identity of the marginal investor. These
distinctions can be viewed in terms of the determination of the appropriate value of
r∗, the cost of funds. Alternatives are briefly examined in this section.
4.1 Foreign Investors
For foreign-sourced equity funds, the investor is not usually subject to domestic taxa-
tion on the real rate of return on equity, rE.
16 Hence:
r∗ = rE (20)
Alternatively, suppose foreign-source debt finance is available at a world real interest
rate of rW . Then:
r = rW (21)
Nominal interest rate expenses are tax deductible, so the required real after-tax rate
of return is lower than rW . Substituting for r = rW in equation (14) gives the required
after-tax rate of return with foreign debt financing.
4.2 Domestic Residents and Imputation
In an imputation system, the appropriate tax rate depends on the personal tax status
of the individual investor. Imputation is now less common than formerly, but applies
for example in New Zealand and Australia. If all profits are distributed as dividends,
with associated imputation credits, the corporate tax acts as a withholding tax only.
Whether the investment is debt or equity financed, the appropriate rate is thus the
effective rate on the investor’s investment income, say m. Hence, m simply replaces
τ in the above expressions.17 Even without imputation, it may also be argued that,
to the extent that investment decisions of firms depend on their marginal investors,
the relevant rate is the (marginal) investor’s effective rate. Nevertheless analyses of
16This assumes the existence of double-tax agreements.
17However, in practice it is not clear whether the top marginal personal income tax rate or the trust
rate, or some other rate is appropriate for the investor.
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non-imputation regimes often ignore personal-level taxation and concentrate on the
corporate rate.
5 The Effective Marginal Tax Rate
In general, the effective marginal tax rate can be defined in terms of the proportional
difference between relevant before- and after-tax rates of interest. Define p˜ as the
required equilibrium pre-tax rate of return that is necessary to produce a post-tax rate
of return of r∗. Denote the tax-inclusive effective rate (the rate applied to the return
that includes the tax paid) by EMTRI and the equal-revenue tax-exclusive rate (the
rate applied to the return that excludes the tax paid) by EMTRE. These are marginal
rates since the context is of a marginal investment. Thus:
r∗ = p˜− p˜ (EMTRI) (22)
so that:
EMTRI = 1−
r∗
p˜
(23)
Furthermore:
r∗ = p˜− r∗ (EMTRE) (24)
giving:
EMTRE =
p˜
r∗
− 1 (25)
The inclusive and exclusive rates are therefore related byEMTRE = EMTRI/ (1− EMTRI)
and EMTRI = EMTRE/ (1 + EMTRE).
18 The definitions given here make no ref-
erence to the user cost. The following subsection shows how the effective marginal
rate is related to the user cost concept. In what follows, any reference to the effective
marginal rate is to the tax-inclusive rate, as in (23); this is the rate that compares most
closely with statutory rates such as the corporate rate, τ , and the personal income tax
rate, m.
18In the case of a goods and services tax imposed at the tax-exclusive rate of τ , the pre- and post-
tax goods prices, p0 and p1, are related by p1 = p0 (1 + τ). In this case, the tax-inclusive tax rate is
τ/ (1 + τ).
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5.1 The User Cost and the EMTR
The direct link between the EMTR and the concept of user cost is provided by consid-
ering the equilibrium condition that defines the user cost.19 As defined earlier, the user
cost net of depreciation, cn, is the before-tax rental which ensures that the after-tax
and depreciation return from the marginal investment is equal to the after-tax real rate
of return, r∗. Hence cn can be interpreted as being equivalent to the real before-tax
rate of return, p˜. Hence from (23):
EMTRI = 1−
r∗
cn
(26)
The connection between the user cost and the effective marginal tax rate is illus-
trated in Figure 2. As in Figure 1, the profit maximising position in the absence of
taxation is at point A: in that case the user cost is equal to the real rate of interest.
But in the presence of taxation, which is assumed to be fully shifted, the firm now
needs a before-tax real rate of interest, p˜, that generates an after-tax real rate equal to
r∗, which in turn is equal to the cost of capital in the absence of taxation.
The ‘tax wedge’ between r∗ and p˜, represented by the height CD = p˜− r∗, deter-
mines — along with the shape of the MRPK curve — the desired amount of capital, OE,
in the presence of taxation. Given the downward sloping nature of MRPK, a larger
tax wedge reduces the desired capital further below the profit maximising position that
would arise in the absence of taxation.20
The net user cost was defined earlier as the before-tax and after-depreciation capital
rental, cn, which ensures that the after-tax and depreciation return from the marginal
investment is equal to the after-tax real rate of return, r∗. Hence the net user cost
is represented in Figure 2 by the height EC = cn = p˜. For a marginal investment,
starting from point E, the tax paid is the height CD, which is cn − r
∗. The effective
marginal rate is thus CD divided by the tax base, where the latter is either the length
DE or CE depending on whether the tax-exclusive or inclusive rate is required.
If the tax structure is proportional, as assumed here, then the effective average
tax-inclusive rate, given by the area p˜CDr∗ divided by the area p˜CEO, is clearly equal
19On effective marginal tax rates, see King and Fullerton (1984), McKenzie and Mintz (1992),
McKenzie et al. (1997), Egger et al. (2009) and Fabling et al. (2013).
20The marginal revenue product curve can, in its earlier stages, slope upwards but only the downward
sloping range is relevant.
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Figure 2: User Cost and The Effective Marginal Tax Rate
to the effective marginal tax-inclusive rate, CD/CE. However, in a different situation
in which the use of capital does not correspond to the profit-maximising equilibrium,
and where economic rents are thereby obtained, it has been suggested that a slightly
different definition of effective tax rates is useful, for which the effective average tax
rate does not equal the effective marginal rate.21 As is often the case in this literature,
care is needed using terms: there is an important distinction between ‘economic rent ’
and ‘capital rental ’. The analysis is extended in section 6 to deal with the average
effective tax rate in cases where rents are obtained, but first it is useful to consider the
properties of the marginal rate in more detail.
21However, a desirable property is that as the economic rent tends to zero, the average rate tends
towards the marginal rate.
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5.2 A Formal Statement
To express the effective marginal rate in terms of the various components used above,
first use (7) and cn = cg − δ to get the user cost net of depreciation:
cn =
(r∗ + δ) (1− ξ)− δ (1− τ )
1− τ
(27)
Second, substituting for p˜ = cn into (23) gives the tax-inclusive effective marginal tax
rate as:
EMTRI = 1−
r∗ (1− τ)
(r∗ + δ) (1− ξ)− δ (1− τ)
(28)
In view of the fact that r∗ can be negative, the effective marginal tax rate can exceed
1, just as it can exceed 100% for individuals who are subject to the means-testing of
benefits in addition to income taxation.
Defining the tax component, T = (1− ξ) / (1− τ ), (28) can be expressed as:22
EMTRI = 1−
r∗
(r∗ + δ)T − δ
(29)
or:
EMTRI =
T − 1
T − δ
r∗+δ
(30)
Another way to write (29) is:
EMTRI = τ +
(
δ
r∗+δ
)
τ − ξ(
1−ξ
1−τ
)
−
(
δ
r∗+δ
) (31)
Which indicates how the effective rate differs from the statutory rate. When δ = 0
and k = 0, so that ξ = 0, the effective marginal rate is equal to the statutory rate, τ .
For domestic shareholder-level taxation, the corporate marginal rate is replaced by the
appropriate shareholder rate, m.
The effective marginal rate can be zero under a number of circumstances. From
(29), EMTRI = 0 when r
∗ = −δ, which requires the real after-tax rate of interest to
be negative. Substituting for r∗ from (13) shows that this requires the nominal interest
rate to equal {pi − (1 + pi) δ} / (1− τ ). The lower bound for the nominal rate is zero,
so that an EMTRI of zero also requires δ < pi/ (1 + pi). Alternatively (29) shows that
22Using this definition of T , it can be seen that cn = (r
∗ + δ)T − δ.
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the marginal tax rate can be zero if T = 1, which arises when k + Z = 1: this is the
case when i = δ′k/ (1− k). A further possibility is where k = 0 and Z = 1, which
requires i = 0 and hence r∗ = −pi/ (1 + pi).23
It is useful to consider the variation in EMTRI further. For example, the net user
cost, cn, is a linear increasing function of the nominal interest rate, i, and a decreasing
function of the inflation rate, pi. The tax component, T , is a nonlinear increasing
function of i, and is independent of pi. The variation in the effective marginal tax rate
is complicated in the present context by the fact that cn can become negative for some
values of i and pi. Hence the expression for EMTRI in (29) can have a singularity
when cn = 0: it is subject to positive and negative asymptotes. Numerical examples
are given below: all cases examined are for the tax-inclusive effective marginal rate.
5.3 Variation in EMTRI with Interest and Inflation Rates
An example of the variation in EMTRI with the nominal interest rate, i, is shown in
Figure 3 for two values of the inflation rate, pi = 0.02 and pi = 0.04. The values are
obtained for τ = 0.3, k = 0.2 and δ = 0.15 = δ′. For low values of i, and the low
inflation rate, the EMTRI is increasing and above the statutory rate of τ = 0.3, while
at higher nominal interest rates the EMTRI is increasing but below the statutory
tax rate. This relationship is highly sensitive to the inflation rate, as can be seen by a
comparison with the profile for pi = 0.04, where the nature of the variation is reversed.24
The EMTRI declines as i increases: at low values of i the effective tax rate moves
below the statutory rate, but for higher values of i, the EMTRI moves towards τ . In
both the cases, the lower ranges of i are associated with negative real rates of interest,
r∗, and negative user costs, cn. The higher ranges of i are associated with positive r
∗
and cn.
25
23The extreme case where k = 1 and z = 0 is too unrealistic to be of interest.
24For examples of profiles with similar characteristics, see King and Fullerton (1984, p. 288).
25In both cases the value of z falls from 0.94 to 0.52 as i rises from 0.01 to 0.14.
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Figure 3: Variation in Effective Marginal Tax Rate with Nominal Interest Rate
5.4 Variation in EMTRI with the Statutory Tax Rate
It is perhaps tempting to think that the EMTRI increases systematically as the statu-
tory marginal tax rate increases. However, the variation is again complicated by the
existence of the singularity in the expression for the effective rate, combined with the
fact that this can arise for relevant ranges of the statutory rate (in combination with
other variables).
5.4.1 The Role of the Nominal Interest Rate
Figure 4 shows the variations in the effective marginal tax rate and the net user cost
of capital as the statutory rate, τ , varies, when the nominal interest rate, i, is held
constant at 0.03 (the dashed line) and at 0.05 (the solid line). These results are obtained
for depreciation rates of δ = δ′ = 0.15 and an inflation rate of pi = 0.02. For the lower
interest rate, the net user cost is positive at low statutory rates and EMTRI is negative
and declines as τ increases. But at higher values of τ the value of cn turns negative
and EMTRI , now positive, decreases with increasing τ . The EMTRI relationship is
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substantially modified for a higher nominal interest rate of 0.05.26 However, the net
user cost decreases steadily, as before, although it remains positive.
5.4.2 The Role of Fiscal Depreciation and Tax Credit Rates
The variation in EMTRI and cn with τ , as the fiscal depreciation rate, δ
′, varies
is illustrated in Figure 5. These profiles are for an economic depreciation rate of
δ = 0.15. In each case the inflation rate is pi = 0.015, the nominal interest rate is
i = 0.03. Hence in the first two examples, the fiscal depreciation rate is below the
economic depreciation rate. In these cases the EMTRI is non-negative and increases
systematically as τ increases, but the nature of the variation is very different. For the
higher fiscal depreciation rate of 0.15, the singularity is in the relevant ranges of τ and
EMTRI is negative and falling as τ increases over low values of τ .
27 The variation
in the net user cost of capital with the statutory rate, shown in the lower diagram in
Figure 5, is much more systematic. For higher fiscal depreciation rates the EMTRI
falls with τ and the gradient increases as δ′ falls, becoming quite steep for the case of
zero fiscal depreciation.
The effect of the investment tax credit rate, k, on the way in which the EMTRI
and cn vary with τ are illustrated in Figure 6. These are obtained for pi = 0.02, i = 0.03
and δ = δ′ = 0.15. The sensitivity of these relationships to variations in the nominal
rate of interest is shown by comparison with Figure 7, where the nominal interest rate
is 0.05.
One implication of the variations shown in these diagrams is that the user cost
measure, and its relationship with the statutory tax rate, often provides a more reliable
indication of the effects of taxation on the incentives facing firms.
26The singularity arises for a much higher and unrealistic statutory rate.
27For higher values of τ the EMTRI is positive and again declines with further increase in τ , while
the net user cost is negative in this range.
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Figure 4: Variation in EMTR and User Cost with Statutory Tax Rate: Nominal
Interest Rates of 0.03 and 0.05
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Figure 5: Variation in EMTR and Net User Cost with Statutory Rate: Alternative
Fiscal Depreciation Rates
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Figure 6: Variation in EMTR and Net User Cost with Statutory Tax Rate for Alter-
native Tax Credit Rates: Nominal Interest Rate of 0.03
22
Figure 7: Variation in EMTR and Net User Cost with Statutory Tax Rate for Alter-
native Tax Credit Rates: Nominal Interest Rate of 0,05
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6 An Effective Average Tax Rate
It has been stressed that the effective tax rates considered in the previous section are
necessarily marginal rates, given that the basic concept of user cost refers to a marginal
investment. However, in the profit-maximising situation for which the concept of user
cost applies, and where the statutory rate is constant (that is, the tax is proportional),
the effective average tax rate is equal to the effective marginal rate. The present section
explains how the analysis can be extended to deal with situations in which the firm is
in the position of earning economic rents.28
An important context in which this may be relevant is that of foreign direct in-
vestment by multinational corporations. The effective marginal rate is not always
the relevant rate in considering investment incentives, since it is expected to apply to
the ‘intensive margin’ (concerning variations in the amount invested). In examining
discrete decisions at the ‘extensive margin’, regarding for example the international
location of investment, where rents may be obtained, a somewhat different concept of
an effective average tax rate may be thought to be more appropriate. An approach
to defining an average tax rate is by Devereux and Griffith (2003), who took as their
starting point a discrete-time variant of the present value of the returns from a non-
marginal investment, V , and the change in the present value of that income stream
resulting from the investment.29 They describe this change in the capital stock as
a ‘perturbation’. The thought experiment here is of a one-period increase in invest-
ment, followed by a decrease in investment in the next period to return the real capital
stock to its previous value. An important assumption of this approach is that the
incentive for the non-marginal investment is an expected return from the investment
that exceeds the required return to make the investment marginally profitable. Hence,
this non-marginal investment is assumed to earn an economic rent, in the presence of
taxation, of R∗.30
In this approach, as in the marginal investment case described above, interest fo-
28As stressed earlier, the fundamental distinction between the concept of economic rent and that
of the capital rental is crucial.
29See also Devereux and Sørensen (2006), Sørensen (2008), Krzepkowski (2013).
30The notation involving ∗ superscripts in the present section is therefore consistent with earlier
sections (and most of the earlier literature) where r∗ and r respectively define real interest rates after
allowing for taxation and before tax. However, it differs from Devereux and Griffith, who use R∗ to
denote values in the absence of taxation.
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cuses on the change, ∆V , in the present value of the returns, after deducting all costs,
arising from the investment. Although the perturbation takes place in period t only, the
returns arise over multiple subsequent periods. However, in this non-marginal case, the
return, net of costs, takes the form of economic rent, R∗, from the investment. Hence:31
R∗ = ∆V =
∞∑
s=0
∆Ωt+s
(1 + i)1+s
(32)
where Ωt represents the after-tax profit in period t, and i is the firm’s nominal discount
rate.
In other words, the present value of the perturbation results from an increase in
the capital stock in period t, leaving all future periods’ capital stocks unchanged. By
focussing on these returns from a non-marginal investment, they are thus not increasing
the use of capital from an initial profit maximising position, which is the focus of the
user cost concept. Rather, the context could be thought of as a decision over the
discrete choice between two mutually exclusive investments, such as when, or where,
to make a given investment. However, the profit maximising case corresponds to setting
R∗ = 0 and solving for the rental rate (the rate of return), which gives the user cost,
cn, as above.
32
In the marginal investment case in section 5, the EMTRI was shown to depend
on the difference between the before-tax marginal rate of return, p˜, and the after-
tax return, r∗; see Figure 2. For the non-marginal case here, a further component
is required, namely the before-tax return on this non-marginal investment, denoted
p, which includes any economic rent associated with the investment. Devereux and
Griffith refer to this as the ‘real financial return’ from a non-marginal perturbation
(as distinct from the real financial rate of return, p˜, from a marginal investment; see
Devereux and Griffith, 2003, p. 111). Investment projects must necessarily involve
using an amount of capital that is less than (or equal to) the profit maximising total
amount such that the real financial return exceeds the user cost. Thus, for R∗ > 0,
p ≥ p˜ = cn.
31Devereux and Griffith (2003, p. 110) write R∗ (or R in their notation) in terms of the shareholders’
nominal discount rate rather than taking the point of view of the firm, as in Hall and Jorgensen (1967).
In considering Ω, any new equity used to fund the investment must be repaid out of the income stream.
There is a small printing error, as the discount factor in their equation (2003, p. 110, equation 3) is
given an exponent of s, instead of s+ 1.
32In their notation cn is denoted by p˜.
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To define the effective average tax rate for this case, it is also necessary to define
R, the net present value of the income stream from the non-marginal perturbation in
the absence of taxation.33 The tax liability associated with the investment can then be
defined as R − R∗, being the difference between the before-tax and after-tax rates of
return. However, the definition of an associated average tax rate is not straightforward.
From Devereux and Griffith (2003), one concept of an average tax rate applying to
this non-marginal investment is the tax-inclusive rate, EATRI-DG, defined as:
34
EATRI-DG =
R−R∗
R
(33)
This is effectively the tax paid divided by the before-tax present value of the income
stream (the before-tax economic rent).35 Devereux and Griffith define an alternative
average rate, EATRDG, in which the tax liability, R−R
∗, is ‘scaled’ by the net present
value of the before-tax income stream, net of depreciation. The latter is simply p,
discounted using the before-tax real interest rate, r, to make it comparable in present
value terms to R−R∗. Hence:
EATRDG =
R−R∗
p/ (1 + r)
(34)
Considering the terms in the numerator of (34), R is the net present value of the rent
associated with the perturbation in the absence of taxation. Remembering that this
also needs discounting only one period, R is given by:
R =
p− r
1 + r
(35)
The term, R∗, the equivalent net present value with taxation, is given by:
R∗ =
(p− p˜) (1− τ )
1 + r
(36)
The term p − p˜, rather than p − r, appears in (36) because, with taxation, p˜ is the
required return (the user cost) in the absence of rents being earned by the investment.
33This rate of return in the absence of taxation is also assumed to be equal to the after-tax rate of
return when tax is introduced. That is, the introduction of the tax does not alter the ‘initial’ required
rate of return received by the investor.
34The notation here differs somewhat from that used by Devereux and Griffith.
35These present values actually involve discounting for only one period (values are received at the
end of the first period), given the nature of the experiment considered.
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With taxation, those rents, p− p˜, are taxed at rate τ , leaving rent net-of-tax but before
discounting, of (p− p˜) (1− τ). Substituting these expressions into (34) gives:
EATRDG =
p˜− r + (p− p˜) τ
p
=
cn − r + (p− cn) τ
p
(37)
Devereux and Griffith also define the tax-inclusive marginal tax rate, referred to
here as EMTRDG, using EMTRDG = (cn − r) /cn, which can be seen to be similar
to the marginal rate in (23), where p˜ = cn. However, whereas (23) follows standard
practice and uses the after-tax interest rate r∗, Devereux and Griffith instead use the
before-tax rate, r, but do not discuss their reasons for this choice.
Figure 8: Effective Average Tax Rate
These alternative tax rate definitions can be illustrated by redrawing Figure 2 for
this non-marginal case. In Figure 8, consider an investment of capital of amount OF
with a marginal revenue product of p per unit, and an after-tax real interest rate,
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r∗. As in Figure 2, for a marginal project the before-tax return, required to yield an
after-tax return of r∗, is p˜. As argued above, for a non-marginal investment to earn
some positive economic rent it is required that OF is less than OE, such that p > p˜.
Measured in per unit of investment terms, and before discounting, the before-tax rent
is therefore given by p− p˜, or the distance GH in Figure 8. It follows that the after-tax
rent is given by (p− p˜)(1−τ ) as shown; namely in (36), and in Figure 8 is a proportion
(1 − τ) of the distance GH; namely GG
′
. However, total tax on the income stream
includes tax on the non-rent component; that is: p˜−r∗ (= HJ). Hence total tax liability
is equal to the sum of those two components, HJ + GG
′
, or (p˜− r∗) + (p− p˜) τ . This
can be seen to be equivalent to the numerator of (37), except that r∗ replaces r, as
discussed above.
Figure 8 also illustrates the alternative methods of defining the tax rate, which
should be measured using the corresponding tax base. If the tax base is defined as
the total return, then the tax rate could be defined as a fraction of the tax base, p,
such as EATRDG in (37). However the tax could be thought of as applying to a base
measured as the return in excess of a measure of the cost of capital, r or r∗ in Figure
8, where this cost is regarded as deductible from the total tax base in determining
tax liability.36 In this case the tax base would be, for example, p− r, which, suitably
discounted, is shown in (35) to be equal to R. Devereux and Griffith (2003) argue in
favour of the total tax base, p, in part because it facilitates comparison with backward-
looking average tax rates based on actual tax and capital income (profit) data, rather
than economic rents, and because a tax rate based on R, such as EATRI-DG in (33),
is undefined for a marginal investment where R = 0.
Average and marginal tax rates therefore differ for an investment involving economic
rents. The relationship between the two rates can be see by rearranging (37). Using
the definition of EMTRDG above, the two effective rates can be shown to be related
as follows:
EATRDG = EMTRDG
(
cn
p
)
+ τ
(
1−
cn
p
)
(38)
This is equivalent to the decomposition given by Devereux and Griffith (2003, p. 112).
Their effective average rate is thus a weighted average of their effective marginal tax
36Of course, the extent to which this cost is deductible, typically depends on a number of conditions
such as whether the investment is equity or debt financed.
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rate and the statutory tax rate, with weights depending on the ratio of the user cost
to the capital rental associated with the non-marginal investment.
For small projects, well below the profit maximising scale, p is likely to be much
larger than cn, so that cn/p is small (except where investment returns decline only
slowly with the scale of an investment; that is, if the MRPK curve in Figure 8 is
relatively flat). For this ‘small cn/p’case the effective average rate is relatively close to
the statutory tax rate. For larger projects, as p approaches cn the ratio moves closer to
1 and the average effective tax rate is closer to the marginal rate. For p = cn, average
and marginal rates are equal, and this clearly corresponds to the case discussed at the
end of subsection 5.1.
Devereux and Griffith further show that, where it is desired to allow for differences
between personal and corporate-level taxation, the statutory rate, τ , is replaced by
an ‘adjusted statutory tax rate’, τ ′. In particular, this adjustment takes account of
any differences in the personal tax treatment of new equity and distributions, and
discounting uses the shareholders’ nominal discount rate, ρ, rather than the nominal
interest rate, i, faced by the firm. Devereux and Griffith (2003, p. 113) show that the
appropriate adjusted statutory rate is:
τ ′ = 1− γ (1− τ)
(1 + r) (1 + pi)
(1 + ρ)
(39)
where γ reflects the differential personal treatment of new equity and dividend distri-
butions. The term (1 + r) (1 + pi) is, by Fisher’s equation, equal to (1 + i), so that if
ρ = i and γ = 1, τ ′ = τ .37
7 Investment and the User Cost
It has been seen that the user cost concept is intimately related to optimal investment
by a profit maximising firm. The firm invests, that is adjusts its capital stock, to the
point where the returns match the cost of capital. This gives rise to an equimarginal
condition which can be used to express the user cost in terms of the interest rate, the
inflation rate, depreciation, taxation and so on. Only values at the time of investment
are relevant because of the assumption that investment is reversible and there are no
37Devereux and Griffith differ from most other literature in using the shareholders’ discount rate to
derive present values of returns.
29
adjustment costs. In this case there are clear implications for the optimal capital stock
in terms of the user cost.
The gross user cost, as a pre-tax rental, is the capital rental associated with profit
maximisation. Expressing the production function as a function of only capital, K,
output is Y = F (K) and the capital rental is the marginal revenue product, equal to
the product of marginal revenue and the marginal physical product of capital. In a com-
petitive market, marginal revenue and price are equal, and the latter can be normalised
to unity. Hence cg = ∂F (K) /∂K = F
′
K. Consider the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion, with an exponent of α on capital services. Then F ′K = αY/K. If K
∗ represents
the desired capital stock, it is simply given by rearranging αF (K∗) /K∗ = cg, so that:
K∗ =
αY
cg
(40)
Hence the logarithm of the desired capital stock is a linear function of the logarithm
of output and the logarithm of the user cost.
This can easily be extended to deal with imperfect output markets and, say, the
constant elasticity of substitution production function. For inputs of labour and capital
of L and K, and normalising the efficiency term to unity, the Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) function is (with a re-definition of α):
Y = (αKρ + βLρ)1/ρ (41)
where ρ = 1− 1
σ
and σ is the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. The
marginal physical product of capital is:
∂Y
∂K
= αKρ−1Y 1−ρ (42)
If the price of the good per unit is p and the elasticity of demand is η, then using
the well-known property that marginal revenue, MR = p
(
1− 1
η
)
, the capital rental is
given by:
cg = (MR)
∂Y
∂K
(43)
= αpKρ−1Y 1−ρ
(
1−
1
η
)
(44)
and using 1− ρ = 1/σ, desired capital stock is:
K∗ = Y
(
α
1− 1
ρ
)σ (
cg
p
)
−σ
(45)
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As with the simple Cobb-Douglas case, the desired capital stock is a loglinear function
of output and user cost, but the coefficient on the logarithm of user cost is −σ rather
than −1.
Sometimes the expression for desired capital stock is used along with a specified
adjustment process in order to produce an investment function. However, this neces-
sarily involves a serious conflict, since the fundamental user cost derivation discussed
earlier explicitly assumes there are no adjustment costs (the cost of capital is fixed in-
dependent of the amount of investment). However, from the basic relationship relating
capital at time, t, and t− 1, and investment, It:
Kt = Kt−1 + It − δKt−1 (46)
Rearrangement gives the following expression for the growth rate of capital:
Kt −Kt−1
Kt−1
=
It
Kt−1
− δ (47)
This proportional change can be approximated by the change in logarithms, ∆kt. For
example, a simple partial adjustment specification has ∆kt = θ (k
∗
t − kt−1). Alter-
natively, error-correction or distributed lag models can be applied.38 The effect on
investment of changes in tax regulations or rates can therefore be traced via the effect
on user cost.
8 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to provide an introductory review of the concept of user
cost and its determinants. The concept of user cost was seen to relate to the rental, the
rate of return to capital, that arises in a profit maximising situation in which further
investment in capital produces no additional profit. Despite this apparently simple
statement it has been seen that the concept gives rise to a complex taxonomy or range
of cases which need to be distinguished. This paper sets out in some detail, using
a consistent terminology, the range of assumptions involved in obtaining alternative
expressions for the user cost.
The user cost refers to a before-tax capital rental, the rate of return that ensures
that the (after-tax) cost of capital is equal to the post-tax returns. Hence, associated
38On alternative specifications, see Bond and Van Reenen (2003).
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with the user cost measure is an effective marginal tax rate. This can differ substantially
from the statutory marginal rate applicable to the investor. Particular attention was
given to the properties of the effective marginal tax rate in different circumstances,
drawing attention to the difference between tax-inclusive and exclusive rates.
A related effective average tax rate was also defined for the context in which the
firm obtains economic rents. This may be important in the context of multinational
investment where the firm is operating below its profit maximising output. The link
between the user cost, effective tax rates and investment was only briefly discussed as
this warrants separate extensive treatment.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Basic Hall and Jor-
gensen Result
In their seminal paper, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) used a continuous-time approach.
This appendix explains how their first result is derived. They began by taking the
simplest case of no taxation, no depreciation and no inflation. A firm makes a marginal
increase in its input of capital by obtaining a new capital good at time, t, with a supply
price of capital of q (t). Capital services at time, s ≥ t, are valued at c(s). Hence c (s)
measures the marginal revenue product, and this clearly depends on the price of the
good produced by the firm as well as the productivity of the equipment. Strictly, this
rental depends on the marginal revenue, but on the assumption that the good is sold
in a competitive market, price and marginal revenue are equal. Investment continues
up to the point where the supply price, q (t) is equal to the present value of additional
returns. Hence, at the profit maximising position, and with continuous discounting at
the rate, r, Hall and Jorgenson (1967) write:
q (t) =
∫
∞
t
c (s) e−r(s−t)ds (A.1)
An implication is that a further marginal increase in capital, made in only period t,
involving an increase in q (t), is exactly matched by the change in the present value
of returns, measured by the right-hand side of (A.1). Writing q˙ (t) = ∂q(t)
∂t
, a further
marginal increase in capital, made in only period t, involving an increase in q (t), is
exactly matched by the change in the present value of returns, measured by the right-
hand side of (A.1). Hence:
∂q (t)
∂t
=
∂
∂t
∫
∞
t
c (s) e−r(s−t)ds (A.2)
This equation therefore expresses the kind of investment that was discussed above.
There is a marginal investment in one period which is reversed in the subsequent
period. The right-hand side can be obtained by using the Leibniz Integral Rule. This
states, for the general function f (s, t) and limits of integration given by a (t) and b (t),
that:
∂
∂t
∫ b(t)
a(t)
f (s, t) ds =
∫ b(t)
a(t)
∂f (s, t)
∂t
ds+ f (b (t) , t)
∂b (t)
∂t
− f (a (t) , t)
∂a (t)
∂t
(A.3)
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Consider the term in (A.2) corresponding to the first term in (A.3). Then:
∂
∂t
{
c (s) e−r(s−t)
}
= c (s) re−r(s−t) (A.4)
so that: ∫
∞
t
∂
∂t
{
c (s) e−r(s−t)
}
ds = r
∫
∞
t
c (s) e−r(s−t)ds (A.5)
which is equal to rq (t) . Furthermore, it can be seen that the second term in (A.5) is
zero and the third term is simply c (t): this is because the term f (a (t) , t) is equal to
c (t) e−0 = c (t) and ∂a(t)
∂t
= 1. Hence, writing q˙ (t) = ∂q(t)
∂t
, (A.2) becomes:
q˙ (t) = rq (t)− c (t) (A.6)
This is the Hall and Jorgensen result. The fact that only period-t values are relevant
in (A.6) arises from the strong assumption that the project is reversible. Furthermore,
assume that the price of the capital good does not depend on the amount already
invested, so that there are no adjustment costs: the supply curve is essentially hori-
zontal. This means that q˙ (t) is assumed to be zero. With constant consumer prices,
and dropping the time subscript, t, (A.6) becomes:
c
q
= r (A.7)
The rental per unit of capital is thus equal to the rate of interest. It is conventional to
normalise the price of a unit of the capital good, so that setting q = 1 gives the simple
result that c = r. The rental associated with profit maximisation is, by definition, the
user cost of capital. Hence the user cost is equal to the interest rate.
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Appendix B: Allowing for Uncertainty
Modification of the above results to allow for uncertainty and risk aversion rapidly
becomes very complicated. However, some insight can be obtained by first considering
the simplest possible case where there is no taxation, no depreciation and no capital
gain. In the deterministic case, the user cost of a dollar invested in capital is simply
cg = r. Suppose now that r is uncertain, although the nature of the distribution is
known. Risk aversion is modelled by supposing that there is a concave utility function,
U (cg) associated with the user cost. If the investor is assumed to have constant relative
risk aversion of ε = 1, then utility takes the form U (cg) = c
1−ε
g / (1− ε) .
The certainty-equivalent user cost is that rental which, if received with certainty,
gives the same utility as the expected utility from the distribution. Hence if r has the
distribution function, F (r), the user cost is given by:
c1−εg
1− ε
=
∫
r1−ε
1− ε
dF (r) (B.1)
so that:
cg =
[∫
r1−εdF (r)
]1/(1−ε)
(B.2)
Thus cg is the power mean of order ε of the distribution of r. Some insight may be
obtained by assuming that r is lognormally distributed, so that F (r) = Λ (r|µ, σ2),
with mean and variance of logarithms of µ and σ2 respectively. From the moment
generating function of the lognormal distribution, it is known that:∫
r1−εdΛ (r) = exp
{
(1− ε)µ+
1
2
(1− ε)2 σ2
}
(B.3)
and therefore (supposing that the range of r is 0 < r ∞):
cg = exp
(
µ+
(1− ε)
2
σ2
)
(B.4)
Consider the effect of an increase in uncertainty. If this is assumed to result simply
from an increase in σ2, the arithmetic mean as well as the variance of r changes, since
the arithmetic mean is given by E (r) = exp
(
µ+ 1
2
σ2
)
. However, increasing risk can be
modelled as a mean-preserving spread of the distribution. Hence, when σ2 increases,
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the value of µ must fall to maintain a constant arithmetic mean. From the total
differential:
dE (r) = E (r) dµ+
1
2
E (r) dσ2 (B.5)
It can be seen that:
dµ
dσ2
∣∣∣∣
E(r)
= −
1
2
(B.6)
Thus the effect on the user cost of a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty is given
by totally differentiating (B.4):
dcg
dσ2
= cg
dµ
dσ2
∣∣∣∣
E(r)
+
cg (1− ε)
2
= −
cg
2
+
cg (1− ε)
2
= −
cgε
2
(B.7)
and the elasticity of cg with respect to a mean-preserving increase in σ
2 is:
ηc,σ2 =
σ2
cg
dcg
dσ2
= −
εσ2
2
(B.8)
The elasticity of user cost with respect to a mean-preserving spread in r is thus (minus)
half the product of the degree of relative risk aversion and the variance of logarithms
of r. In the risk-neutral case, increased uncertainty (as a mean-preserving spread) has
no effect since only expected values matter.
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